Response and Tactics to Counter Riot Police
One man in the street armed with shield and baton or even firearm cannot defeat ten unarmed people unless they let him.
The numbers are on the side of the protestors in Iran; determination is on their side. Experience and tactics work against them. Perhaps this information will help. I received riot control training as a member of the Army National Guard and as an operator working for an international security company that specialized in strikes.
As has been witnessed in some cases of anti-riot employment, vehicles impede riot-control actions. Vehicles cause disruption of the riot-control formation and isolation of its members, making them more vulnerable and less effective. If the vehicles are moving slowly, especially in coordination with the public assembly the effect is intensified. In the videos I have seen, the Iranian police have very little formation discipline, which makes breaking their formations easier.
The numbers are generally on the side of the public in any protest activity, the public simply needs to know how to use riot-control formations as a liability to the police. The simplest tactic is to surround and overwhelm; this was demonstrated in Tehran on 16 June and other occasions. The basic riot formations are line and wedge. The line is the only one seen thus far in Iran, and is the easier of the two to overcome. The wedge is not much more difficult. The key is to manipulate the formation into braking apart or into going to an area in which it can be flanked. Once flanked, the line is easily overwhelmed from the sides and the rear. General rule, those seeking to disrupt and disarm a riot line must outnumber the lime 3-1 or better. If the line has additional support- officers, skirmishers, tear gas/pepper-spray individuals, etc, the numerical advantage should be 5+-1. This in mind, there is no reason that 7000 police should be able to hold Tehran against rallies.
The reason the police were able to effect such massacres recently is because the protestors attempted to assemble on-site rather than assembling elsewhere and forcing the police to move toward them. This of course presumes that the protestors have adequate communication to assemble away from police and then begin moving. Communication and coordination is the key to successful assembly. Being able to mount a disinformation campaign at the government forces would be immensely helpful.
There are a number of larger scale tactics that can be used to make it easier to overwhelm and overcome the riot-control forces.
To overcome or avoid snipers, which have been employed in Iran, it is necessary to occupy the highest rooftops possible so as to permit observation. That said, it is also necessary for the observer(s) to communicate locations when a sniper is observed. Multiple rooftop occupations are extremely helpful and can be used as a deterrent, if necessary. This also permits observation of troop movements in general.
The assemblies should have formations and members of those formations should be aware of how to react to various situations. If assaulted frontally by riot-control, the easiest and most likely scenario, the rear of the assembly should know to split off to the side(s), either to sidewalks or crossing streets. Everyone should be constantly looking for side avenues into which to divert to launch a counter move. When the front of the assembly, preferably at least five people deep, meets the riot police, they should close with them without offering additional provocation. Up close, it is harder for the police to use their batons effectively, as they seem to prefer slashing with their batons instead of thrusting. Once the close has been accomplished, the lead elements should start backing up, leading the riot-control element towards the rear elements who should have positioned themselves to the side(s). If certain that the rear elements have positioned themselves and are ready, the lead elements can even run to their fallback position. Iranian police have demonstrated a tendency to give chase which will further weaken their formation. Once the riot formation has committed itself to the pursuit of the lead assembly element, they will carry themselves, in formation or not, past the rear assembly elements, who are now in flanking position. Once this happens, the lead element reassembles against the riot formation as the rear elements close from the sides and rear. This is the tactic of envelopment.
For larger formations there are two additional tactics to be recommended. These cause the police to split their forces and/or create a condition of mutual support for the assemblies.
In the first case, if participation is going to be sufficiently large, in the tens of thousands, then have two or three, rather than one, assembly areas away from immediate police activity. Have the assemblies form up and approach the intended assembly location from different directions. This will force the police to do one of two things; they will have to split their forces to respond to every march, or they will have to concentrate on them one at a time. If the police split their forces, then every assembly has an easier time confronting their share of the threat. If the police elect to concentrate on one movement, the others have the opportunity to maneuver to the flanks and rear of the police, thus causing envelopment.
The second option is to have the assemblies move along parallel adjacent routes, offering constant mutual support for possible envelopment maneuvers.
Whenever a gunman appears, some should work to keep his attention while others work to flank and disarm him. If the gunman is on a rooftop and there is no way to get to him, then the assembly should move a block away, leaving spotters to observe and report the gunman’s moves.
Finally, regarding the basijis and police on motorcycles. There should be people with light rope or chains in the assemblies. The use of these should be obvious. Once the motorcyclists are unseated, they become relatively easy to defeat, especially if they are unseated while traveling at speed.