Afghanistan Policy Adjustment

The first priority in Afghanistan should be the training of Afghan forces to conduct their own operations at all levels. This includes the Afghan police forces, which have been heavily infiltrated by the Taliban. The Afghan Army needs a better developed Basic Training operation, and this shows as far too many Afghans sent out with coalition forces require training along the way, during operations. While Afghans may be necessary to act as interpreters, for no other reason should an Afghan soldier be sent into the field until he has completed at least two months’ worth of intensive US devised training. Far too often, the Afghan Army has proven itself slow and inaccurate to respond, The Afghan Army often seems to prefer safety and comfort over the operation at hand. This has been pointed out by the Afghans themselves. The better and more effective the Afghan Army is, the more it can be relied upon to carry out the mission, and the less the US and coalition forces need expose themselves to the combat itself and the disgruntlement of the Afghan people with collateral damage. Training the Afghan Army to a higher standard of readiness and behavior should be the focus of any troop increase on the part of the US.

Another area in which Afghans themselves have become disillusioned with the US mission is in the development of infrastructure. It has been widely reported that corruption is a major theme in Afghanistan and much of this corruption has to do with the development of infrastructure. The US needs to take greater control over the budgeting of these various projects, even when the money is in Afghan hands. Many Afghans complain that they cannot see the roads, bridges, schools and hospitals promised by the US. Much of this is due to the allowance of putting this money’s determination into the hands of the Afghan government, where, by the time everyone’s brother and cousin and friend gets paid off, there is nothing left for the project itself. The US must get a handle on this to better insure the support and cooperation of the Afghan people. Without these projects, the Taliban are able to convince many among the population that the US is just there to occupy as the Soviets did 25 years ago. Afghans hate an occupier and have defeated all who have been perceived as such.

While the US relies heavily on various Special Operations units, there should be an even greater emphasis on the use of these forces. Failure to do so initially is part of the reason that al-Qaida was able to project itself for so long and is a continuing reason that the Taliban still is. The effectiveness of Special Operations teams is far beyond that of conventional forces who all too often make a mess of things in applying excessive firepower in the vicinity of non-combatants. Let the conventional forces operate away from populated areas with fewer comforts, and they will prove more effective.

Finally, it is time to face the fact that there are elements within the Taliban that are reasonably moderate and willing to negotiate. These individuals and groups should be invited to talk. They should be carefully screened and included in the process of political discourse. They are Afghan too, and many fight because of the presence of foreign troops only. Like many other Afghans, they want a return to independent statehood and peace.